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1In Brief
 Development Challenge: After the 2014 Ebola outbreak, officials in 
Liberia’s health ministry wanted to build a resilient health system that could 
help prevent a future crisis and provide necessary care in a public health 
emergency. The ministry also wished to improve health outcomes and build 
the confidence of Liberian citizens in the public health system. 
 Project Solution: The health ministry worked with external partners to 
create a plan for investing in the public health system. The plan, which set 
priorities for the period from 2015 to 2021, included investment in training 
and development of health personnel, re-engineering health infrastructure, 
and enhancing the disease surveillance and response system.
 Project Results: As of 2019, the investment plan contributed to outcomes 
including the creation of a new cadre of frontline community health 
personnel, the founding of a new public health institute to advance disease 
surveillance and response, and infrastructure advancements including 
improved laboratory facilities, triages, and isolation units.
Executive Summary
In 2014, an Ebola outbreak hit Liberia, a country with a health system that had 
been severely weakened by two civil wars, economic stagnation, and the loss of 
many skilled and educated health workers who left the country to escape violence. 
By the end of the outbreak in 2015, Liberia experienced a total of 10,685 Ebola 
cases, and 4,809 victims had died. Confidence in public health facilities dropped 
and demand for public sector health services declined. During the outbreak, 
many facilities had temporarily closed due to fear of contamination and spread 
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of the disease. Collaboration between the Liberian 
government and its international partners eventually 
led to the end of the epidemic, but the health ministry’s 
leaders wanted to ensure that the health system would 
be better prepared for the next public health emergency.
There were several challenges to building up the 
Liberian health system. The country lacked skilled health 
workers, particularly specialist doctors and nurses, and 
those shortages were especially acute in rural areas. 
Health workers had clashed with the health ministry 
over complaints including low pay and poor working 
conditions, and had gone on strike shortly before Ebola 
arrived in the country. Those tensions were detrimental 
to the motivation of health workers. Liberia was very 
dependent on donor support for the functioning of its 
health system, but that support was often fragmented 
and it was difficult for the government to track exactly 
what was being funded and implemented throughout the 
country. There was also a basic problem of weak health 
infrastructure, including lack of proper equipment, few 
triage facilities, and a poorly functioning supply chain.
As Liberia began to bring the Ebola crisis under control 
in late 2014, health ministry leaders saw an opportunity 
to transition from the short-term emergency response 
to a longer-term plan for strengthening the health 
system. Through consultations with internal and external 
stakeholders, the ministry created an investment plan for 
building a resilient health system, to run until 2021. The 
three highest-priority areas were: building a productive 
and motivated health workforce that fit the needs of the 
country, reengineering the health infrastructure, and 
strengthening the epidemic preparedness, surveillance, 
and response system. Fully realizing the investments in 
the plan would cost an estimated total of $1.7 billion, 
but the ministry forecasted a $735 million gap based on 
existing donor commitments.
This study highlights several aspects of the investment 
plan. First, the plan provided for the creation of a new 
cadre of paid community health assistants, a model 
piloted in cooperation with a local NGO. Second, it 
included measures to improve the health workforce, 
such as an emergency hiring and management plan to 
transform lower-paid contractors into civil servants 
and academic partnerships to strengthen postgraduate 
medical education. Third, it provided for the creation of a 
public health institute to strengthen disease surveillance 
and response. Fourth, it guided investment in new health 
infrastructure.
As of 2019, several positive results were apparent. 
Community health assistants across the country helped 
connect rural communities to the public health system and 
the National Public Health Institute of Liberia improved 
the health system’s emergency response capability. More 
health facilities had isolation units and triages than was 
the case in 2014, when the Ebola outbreak began. The 
country’s laboratory facilities greatly improved, allowing 
samples to be tested for at least seven priority infectious 
diseases within 24 hours. The density of health facilities 
increased from 1.6 per 10,000 population in 2015 to 1.9 
per 10,000 in 2016. Despite progress made, however, 
the number of trained health workers remained far 
below the needs of the country and out of pocket health 
expenditures remained high, evidence that the public 
health system was still not meeting demands.
Lessons learned from this case study include the 
importance of incorporating donors and external 
partners into long-term planning and policymaking 
after a crisis and the need for donors and implementing 
partners to invest in permanent infrastructure during a 
health crisis, not only temporary structures.
Introduction
On July 23, 2014 a man walked into the health ministry’s 
headquarters in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, and 
started a fire in a second-floor conference room. Smoke 
billowed through the hallways and workers fled the 
building. “We potentially could all have lost our lives,” said 
Miatta Zenabu Gbanya, who managed a pool of donor 
funds at the health ministry and played a leading role in 
the Ebola response. The fire service was nowhere to be 
found, but ministry general services and maintenance 
workers eventually contained the fire and limited the 
damage. It was a shock, but Gbanya and her colleagues 
had no time to collect themselves.1 
The arsonist had lost a family member to Ebola, and 
he was furious at the government’s failure to protect his 
family (Williams, 2014). The Ebola virus epidemic that 
had begun in March of that year was rapidly growing, 
from 39 reported cases in June to 278 in July, and the 
ministry struggled to combat the outbreak (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2019). 
1  Author interview with Miatta Zenabu Gbanya, Liberia Ministry of Health, 
December 12, 2018.
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At the time of the fire, the country was in crisis. In 
August, Liberian security forces clashed with protestors 
in West Point, a neighborhood in Liberia’s capital city, who 
were upset with the quarantine under which they lived 
after the looting of an Ebola treatment unit there. When 
the military opened fire on protesters, a 15-year-old boy 
was killed and two others injured (Schreiber, 2017) An 
assistant to Bernice Dahn, at the time the country’s chief 
medical officer, succumbed to the disease in September 
and Dahn placed herself under 21-day quarantine (BBC 
News, 2014). Liberia saw 1,049 cases of Ebola in August 
2014, 2,080 in September, and a peak of 3,077 in October 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2019). 
The outbreak came during a period of post-war 
rebuilding and recovery. Two civil wars ravaged Liberia 
from 1989 to 1997 and 1999 to 2003, killing roughly 
250,000 people. The government collapsed, per capita 
gross domestic product fell by 87 percent between 1980 
and 2005, and many of the most skilled and educated 
citizens fled the fighting. The health system was left 
in tatters, the country had some of the worst health 
indicators in the world, and more than 90 percent of health 
services were delivered by external agencies and NGOs. 
Following elections in 2005, a new health ministry began 
to rebuild the system and some expatriates returned to 
assist their homeland, but the country was still one of 
the poorest in the world, with very limited human and 
financial resources. Progress had been made by 2014, but 
Ebola’s rapid and deadly spread overwhelmed the system 
(Wolmarans & Akwataghibe, 2017).
By the end of the outbreak in 2015, Liberia experienced 
a total of 10,675 Ebola cases. Of those, 4,809 people died 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2019). The 
disease wreaked havoc on every aspect of Liberian life. 
International trade plummeted and the economy ground 
to a halt. Schools closed their doors. 
During the worst days of the outbreak, many health 
facilities were temporarily shut down due to fear of 
the disease’s spread and the delivery of regular health 
care was frozen. Health workers often shunned Ebola 
patients, who were left unattended. Ebola ultimately 
claimed the lives of 184 health workers. This experience 
led to diminished confidence in public health facilities 
and reduced demand for public sector health services 
(Liberia Ministry of Health, 2015). Many Liberians 
turned to traditional or informal health care providers 
for care, or paid for treatment in the private sector. Even 
when they did access the public sector health system, 
they often found shortages of medicines and personnel, 
dissuading many from returning to those facilities when 
they next sought care (Health Systems Global, 2016).
Collaboration between the Liberian government and 
its international partners eventually led to the end of the 
epidemic. Key interventions included the establishment 
of Ebola treatment centers, community engagement 
campaigns, triage processes, and contact tracing. The 
World Health Organization declared the country Ebola-
free in May 2015. As the crisis drew to an end, Gbanya, 
Dahn (who become health minister in 2015), and the 
health ministry’s other leaders wanted to ensure that 
such a public health disaster would never happen again. 
The Development Challenge: 
Creating a Resilient Health 
System
Officials in Liberia’s health ministry had one overriding 
goal: to create a resilient health system. That meant 
a system that was not overwhelmed by shocks and 
continued to provide services at all times. A stronger 
health system would also improve health outcomes.
The health ministry aimed to turn the response to 
the crisis into an opportunity to strengthen the system. 
“During Ebola we realized we had not focused sufficiently 
on emergency preparedness or response,” Dahn said.2 This 
was especially important because of Liberia’s location 
in West Africa, a region disproportionately affected by 
tuberculosis, malaria, HIV, and other infectious diseases. 
The first priority was a health system that would 
not collapse when faced with a crisis. It could provide 
health services to all citizens, detect outbreaks before 
they overwhelmed the system, and quickly contain the 
spread of a disease. The ministry also wanted to continue 
progress that had been made prior to the outbreak. “We 
were making headway rebuilding the health sector when 
Ebola came in,” Dahn said.3 The country had improved 
health outcomes from the end of the civil war to the 
time of the Ebola outbreak. Between 2004 and 2014, 
the health ministry introduced a basic package of health 
services in more than 80% of health facilities, the number 
2  Author Interview with Bernice Dahn, A. M. Dogliotti College of Medicine, 
December 11, 2018
3  Author Interview with Bernice Dahn, A. M. Dogliotti College of Medicine, 
December 11, 2018
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of facilities providing comprehensive and emergency 
obstetric and neonatal care quadrupled, and infant 
mortality dropped significantly. Liberia had achieved a 
Millennium Development Goal target by reducing its 
child mortality rate by more than two-thirds compared 
to a 1990 baseline. The proportion of births attended 
by a skilled health professional rose from 40 percent in 
2007 to 61.6 percent in 2013. The maternal mortality 
rate remained high, however, at roughly 1,000 maternal 
deaths per 100,000 live births as of 2013 (Josephson, 
Rajkotia, Banzon, & Andoh Adjei, 2014). The health 
ministry encouraged antenatal visits, but the majority 
of women did not utilize these services. In 2011, only 42 
percent of women with a live birth had received at least 
four antenatal care visits during their pregnancy and 
only 37 percent of mothers had postnatal consultations 
(World Health Organization, n.d.).
After the outbreak, indicators showed backsliding in 
health system usage. The number of outpatient visits in 
the public sector fell by 61 percent in August through 
December 2014 compared to the same period the previous 
year. Usage of antenatal care services fell by 43 percent 
and institutional deliveries dropped 38 percent. The 
measles vaccination rate fell by 45 percent and the DTP3 
rate by 53 percent (Liberia Ministry of Health, 2015). 
Investment could counteract this by raising confidence in 
the government’s health facilities and encouraging more 
people to seek care in the public health system.
Delivery Challenges
Strengthening the health system required the health 
ministry to overcome several obstacles. The country’s 
health infrastructure was poor, there was a lack of 
skilled manpower, tensions between government and 
the health workers affected the workforce’s commitment 
and motivation, and the relationship between the health 
ministry and numerous donors was complicated and 
difficult to coordinate.
Basic Health Infrastructure
Liberia’s lack of financial resources and history of conflict 
contributed to an underdeveloped health infrastructure. 
Around 29 percent of Liberians, and 60 percent of 
rural Liberians, lived more than five kilometers from 
the nearest health facility (Wolmarans & Akwataghibe, 
2017). Health facilities were poorly designed, often lacked 
necessary medical equipment and supplies, and were not 
equipped to provide the occupational and patient safety 
needed to handle disease outbreaks. Only 45 percent of 
701 health care facilities surveyed by the WHO in 2015 
had an improved water source (Abrampah, et al., 2017). 
Infection prevention and control practices were also very 
poor at health facilities, contributing to infections and 
deaths among health workers in the early period of the 
Ebola outbreak.4
Much of the support from international partners 
during the Ebola response went to temporary 
infrastructure. Ebola treatment units and community 
care centers constructed throughout the country were 
crucial to getting the epidemic under control, but 
they were decommissioned after the response came 
to an end. “We usually do not have budget lines for 
infrastructure,” Gbanya said. “Our facilities, or most 
of them, were not built to deal with these things that 
are happening now.” One notable shortcoming was a 
dearth of triage facilities, which allowed potential cases 
of infectious disease to be detected and isolated before 
encountering other patients in a health facility. “Our 
health facilities were not ready to receive patients in a 
way that they were isolated,” Gbanya said. “We had a lot 
of people get infected.”5
The health ministry also had very limited capacity to 
test patient specimens and confirm the presence of Ebola 
or other infectious diseases. Liberia initially sent suspected 
Ebola specimens to Guinea for testing. The Ebola 
response included the creation of a national emergency 
operations center and the Incident Management System 
to coordinate the response, but the long-term resiliency 
of the health system required permanent surveillance 
and response structures that could detect a future disease 
outbreak in the early stages.
A related issue was poor data collection and 
management. There were different parallel systems 
for health information that were not connected or 
interoperable. The vital statistics system was not well 
developed, meaning that many births and deaths 
were not registered. “As a country, investment in data 
collection and management has been to a large extent 
not very encouraging,” said A. Vaifee Tulay, the deputy 
minister for planning and research. “We’ve always had 
4  Author interview with Miatta Zenabu Gbanya, Liberia Ministry of Health, 
December 12, 2018.
5  Author interview with Miatta Zenabu Gbanya, Liberia Ministry of Health, 
December 12, 2018.
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issues with data quality. … They are not well-managed or 
well-utilized.”6
A serious challenge related to infrastructure was the 
supply chain, which was dysfunctional and fragmented. 
Poor road infrastructure, unsuitable storage, limited 
warehousing capacity, inventory and warehouse 
management practices, and problems with information 
sharing led to frequent stockouts of medicines and health 
supplies. Donors lacked confidence in the government 
supply chain, choosing to use their own supply chains 
in programs they managed (Liberia Ministry of Health, 
2015).
Drugs were stored in seven different warehouses, 
making them difficult to track and control. When they 
were dispatched to health facilities around the country, 
medicine could disappear at every step of the chain. “The 
drug disappears from the warehouse, on the road to 
the clinic, in the county depot, in the clinic,” Dahn said. 
Those same drugs might be found later for sale on the 
street or in private pharmacies.7 The supply chain system 
had problems with management, procurement, storage, 
distribution, and quality control and assurance, leading 
to periodic stockout of medicines. “The way our supply 
chain system was set up, it was not done in a way that in 
an emergency you would be able to cope with the influx 
of additional drugs and medical supplies,” Gbanya said. 
The already-challenged system was overstretched during 
the Ebola epidemic and it was not an area prioritized 
during the early stages of the Ebola response or in the 
immediate post-Ebola environment.8
Shortages of drugs and equipment could dissuade 
people from returning to the public sector health system. 
“You are building the trust of the people,” said Francis 
Kateh, another key figure in the Ebola response who 
in 2015 became the health ministry’s deputy minister 
for health services and chief medical officer, in charge 
of the ministry’s department of health services and the 
government’s senior advisor on health matters. “If the 
people get to the facility and there are no drugs and there 
is not basic equipment, this sends negative feedback. So 
they may not be inclined to go to the facility. As we build 
6  Author interview with A. Vaifee Tulay, Liberia Ministry of Health, December 10, 
2018.
7  Author interview with Bernice Dahn, A. M. Dogliotti College of Medicine, 
December 11, 2018.
8  Author interview with Miatta Zenabu Gbanya, Liberia Ministry of Health, 
December 12, 2018.
the public trust, it is incumbent on us to make sure we 
put in the necessary supplies.”9
Skilled Manpower
A major obstacle to building a resilient health system 
was the limited human resources the health ministry 
had available. There were insufficient numbers of health 
workers, and they were not efficiently distributed 
throughout the country. The number of health workers 
rose from 6.3 per 10,000 people in 2010 to 8.6 per 10,000 
in 2014, a 37 percent increase, but that was not enough to 
meet the country’s needs. A WHO report suggested that 
at least 20 per 10,000 was necessary to achieve a basic 
health system goal: ensure that a minimum threshold 
of 80 percent of births were attended by a skilled health 
worker (World Health Organization, 2008). As of 2015, 
the health ministry estimated that Liberia needed 1,754 
additional doctors and 5,889 nurses and midwives 
(Wolmarans & Akwataghibe, 2017).
“We have an artificial shortage [of workers] in many 
areas,” Kateh said. The Monrovia area was well-populated 
with health workers, but “in some of our rural areas 
there were none.”10 In the counties outside of the capital, 
small numbers of health workers were overstretched. In 
addition, the health workforce did not fit the needs of the 
country because of shortages in most cadres of health 
workers, including physicians, specialist physicians, 
specialist nurses, and laboratory technicians. The 
only cadre with adequate numbers was non-specialist 
nurses. Training for health workers in the system was 
uncoordinated and not linked to any staff development 
plan based on the system’s needs (Liberia Ministry of 
Health, 2015).
Lack of Commitment
Motivation was a serious problem affecting the 
performance of workers in the health system. “When we 
started the Ebola response, we were dealing with a de-
motivated workforce,” Gbanya said.11  In February 2014, 
just before the Ebola outbreak that March, the country’s 
health workers went on strike. It was the second strike 
in less than a year. The striking workers, the majority of 
9  Author interview with Francis Kateh, Liberia Ministry of Health, December 12, 
2018.
10  Author interview with Francis Kateh, Liberia Ministry of Health, December 12, 
2018.
11  Author interview with Miatta Zenabu Gbanya, Liberia Ministry of Health, 
December 12, 2018.
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whom were nurses, requested higher salaries, overtime 
pay and other benefits, timely payment of wages, and full 
civil servant status for health workers who had spent at 
least a year working as contractors. Around 40 percent of 
the health workforce was not on the ministry of health’s 
regular civil servant payroll (Liberia Ministry of Health, 
2015), but rather worked as contractors paid by the 
government or donors. Those contractors earned less 
than civil servants and lacked benefits such as pensions. 
The ministry stated that it did not have the funds available 
to make them all civil servants (Africa News, 2017). (The 
ministry’s funding came from a combination of domestic 
revenue and external funding.) Health workers also 
protested poor working conditions, including the lack of 
protective gear that could reduce the risk they contracted 
infectious diseases including Ebola (FrontPageAfrica, 
2014).
The situation created tension between the health 
workers, represented by a health workers’ association, 
and the health ministry leadership. The health minister 
at the time of labor actions in 2013 and 2014 told workers 
that the health budget was not large enough to meet their 
demands (Lazuta, 2013). In response to the February 2014 
strike, the minister called the workers’ actions “illegal” 
and threatened not to process that month’s payroll until 
the ministry could determine which workers were still on 
the job (Daily Observer, 2014). Negotiations eventually 
resolved the strike, but relations between health ministry 
leadership and the health workers remained fragile due 
to unresolved issues.12 
The experience of responding to the Ebola virus 
further shook these already unhappy workers. “All the 
hospital and clinic staff were uncomfortable going to 
work,” Gbanya said. “They felt they could get infected, 
especially with the news of health workers’ deaths. We 
started off with losing a lot of healthcare workers.” The 
association again called for a work slowdown in October 
2014,13 during the Ebola outbreak, demanding increased 
risk fees for those dealing with Ebola cases and more 
protective equipment and insurance for health workers, 
although the majority of health workers disregarded the 
call to strike and continued to care for the sick (Sifferlin, 
2014). Tensions between the government and health 
workers calmed to a degree after September 2014 when 
12  Author interview with Miatta Zenabu Gbanya, Liberia Ministry of Health, 
December 12, 2018.
13  Author interview with Miatta Zenabu Gbanya, Liberia Ministry of Health, 
December 12, 2018.
the World Bank stepped in to pay health workers’ hazard 
pay and death benefits to workers’ families.14
As the health workforce asked for better pay, benefits, 
and working conditions, health ministry leaders worried 
about the effect of poor motivation long after the Ebola 
outbreak subsided. When people felt their work was not 
valued, they might not put full effort into their work. 
“The biggest problem to get to is the attitudes towards 
the work,” Dahn said. “There were times that people were 
supposed to be on duty, but would not be there.”15 
A lack of motivation affected the quality of health 
service delivery and could yield “poor interaction with 
patients, showing up late and leaving early,” Kateh said. 
“Unhappy doctors may make the wrong diagnosis.”16
Donor-Governmental Relations
External partners had been an essential part of getting 
the Ebola outbreak under control, but the presence of 
many different actors in the health system complicated 
the government’s efforts to set and track progress 
toward national health policy goals. The health ministry 
struggled to coordinate with the many international 
donors and partners working in Libera. “During the Ebola 
outbreak, we had an influx of partners unlike before,” said 
Yah Zolia, a former deputy health minister for planning. 
“Before Ebola, coordination was easier because people 
understood what they were doing. We had a common 10-
year plan. … All of a sudden we are faced with this huge 
onslaught of partners. How do you coordinate them? 
How do you make them align?”17 It was a challenge for the 
government to track exactly how much financial support 
came from outside of Liberia to support the health sector, 
and what was being funded and implemented throughout 
the country. The health ministry needed a way to better 
coordinate the contributions of these many donors.
The problem of coordinating external actors was 
also apparent in the fragmentation of community health 
volunteers. Many villages were more than five kilometers 
from the nearest health facilities, and during the rainy 
season travel to a clinic could take many hours, even 
requiring difficult trips by canoe through overflowing rivers. 
14  Author interview with Miatta Zenabu Gbanya, Liberia Ministry of Health, 
December 12, 2018.
15  Author interview with Bernice Dahn, A. M. Dogliotti College of Medicine, 
December 11, 2018.
16  Author interview with Francis Kateh, Liberia Ministry of Health, December 12, 
2018.
17  Author interview with Yah Zolia, formerly of Liberia Ministry of Health, 
December 7, 2018.
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Working in these remote areas were different categories 
of volunteers trained in family planning, immunization, 
malaria control, and other skills. There were more than 
8,000 such volunteers as of 2013 (Johnson, et al., 2017). 
Instead of money, volunteers received occasional in-kind 
payments, for example a 25 kilogram bag of rice. Though 
not considered part of the formal health workforce, these 
volunteers were an important tool of the Ebola response. 
They were vital for connecting people in difficult-to-access 
communities with the health system and providing them 
information on Ebola. 
These volunteers did not work directly for the health 
ministry, but instead were attached to various donor-
supported vertical programs. This caused coordination 
problems from the ministry’s perspective. The health 
ministry had no way to ensure that volunteers working 
on different programs throughout rural Liberia were 
contributing to national health policy goals. It was difficult 
to measure their impact on health outcomes. The ministry 
found that donors and implementing partners were not 
always prepared to support the government’s county 
health teams working in their areas of operation, and 
instead set up their own management systems. (Johnson, 
et al., 2017) “We were not really seeing significant impact 
because the community health worker program was very 
fragmented,” Dahn said. “Every partner had their own 
way of doing it.”18
Context
Liberia is classified by the World Bank as a low-income 
country, with a per capita GDP in 2013 of $454, one of 
the lowest in the world. The country was divided into 
five regions, and within those regions were 15 counties 
(Liberia Ministry of Health, 2015).
Since 2005, the government of Liberia had created 
health policies to guide the post-war rebuilding of the 
health system. Basic health care had officially been free 
since 2006, when the government abolished user fees 
in the public sector health system, although informal 
payments were a common practice and out of pocket 
expenditure on health was high, measuring 51 percent of 
total health expenditure, according to the 2012 national 
health accounts. Liberia’s government spent around 10 
18  Author interview with Bernice Dahn, A. M. Dogliotti College of Medicine, 
December 11, 2018.
percent of its annual budget on health, below the target 
of 15 percent set by African Union countries in 2001, 
although nearly all African countries failed to meet that 
target. (Liberia Ministry of Health, 2015)
During the Ebola response, the main health policy 
document in effect was the National Health and Social 
Welfare Policy 2011-2021, which expanded the country’s 
existing package of health services. County health 
teams managed all health ministry-owned facilities, 
ministry-employed human resources, and ministry-
provided material resources in their respective counties. 
External implementing partners primarily worked with 
the county-level teams, with different partners active in 
different geographical areas. The national health policy 
considered implementing partner NGO facilities to be 
part of the public sector health system.
There were 725 health facilities in Liberia in 2014, an 
increase from 618 in 2010. In 2014, there were 35 hospitals, 
51 health centers, 639 clinics, and 137 pharmacies. Of 
those health facilities, 22 percent were private-for-profit, 
and the vast majority of those private facilities were in 
Montserrado (the county containing Monrovia, the 
capital) and neighboring Margibi County. The percentage 
of the population living within five kilometers of a health 
facility was 71 percent countrywide. There were 0.8 
hospital beds per 1,000 people in 2010, far lower than the 
global average of 2.7 per 1,000 as of 2011, according to 
World Bank data. (Liberia Ministry of Health, 2015).
There were many disparities in the distribution of 
health facilities throughout the country and the ability 
of residents to easily access those facilities. The density 
of health facilities varied widely, from a low of 1.0 per 
10,000 population in Bong County to 2.9 in Sinoe County. 
The percentage of people living within five kilometers 
of a health facility ranged from 32 percent in Gbarpolu 
county to 96 percent in Montserrado county (Liberia 
Ministry of Health, 2015). In 2007, only 34 percent of 
births by women in rural areas were attended by a skilled 
health professional, compared to 82 percent among 
urban women (Wright, 2015).
Liberia was very reliant on donor funding for its 
health system. Around half of the country’s total health 
expenditure was financed by donors. The Government of 
Liberia appropriated $63 million for health in 2014/15, 
more than triple its contribution in 2007/2008. Total per 
capita health expenditure increased to $65 in 2011/12, 
climbing higher than the average for West and Central 
African countries. (Liberia Ministry of Health, 2015).
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Tracing the Implementation 
Process
To create a more resilient health system, health ministry 
officials pursued multiple strategies. These included 
putting together an investment plan in cooperation with 
donors and implementing partners, creating a new cadre 
of community health workers, strengthening the health 
workforce through measures including an emergency 
hiring plan and improved training and education, 
the inauguration of a new public health institute, and 
pursuing various infrastructure improvements. 
Creating an Investment Plan
In late 2014, as Liberia began to bring the Ebola crisis 
under control with the help of its international partners, 
health ministry leaders saw an opportunity to transition 
from a short-term emergency response to a longer-term 
plan for strengthening the health system. 
The planning process for the health system investment 
plan began in November 2014. The health ministry 
organized a national meeting at which stakeholders agreed 
on the need for a clear strategy to guide the recovery of 
the health system. The ministry then brought together 
technical experts from the ministry and development 
partners and created thematic technical working groups 
looking at different aspects of the health system. The 
technical working groups drew on a post-Ebola situational 
analysis to identify initiatives that required strengthening 
and developed them into the nine pillars of the new 
investment plan.19 They used that analysis to determine 
what was missing or underemphasized in the 2011-2021 
national health plan, and prioritized those gaps into 
three categories: measures that must be implemented 
immediately (by December 2015), priorities for the 
medium-term period ending in 2017, and longer-term 
priorities to be implemented by 2021 (Liberia Ministry 
of Health, 2015). Inputs from county health teams, civil 
society, the private sector, regulators, legislators, other 
ministries, and partners were used to develop the plan. 
The ministry and its partners identified three 
investment areas as the highest-priority “big ticket” 
areas: a “fit-for-purpose” (meaning the size and skillsets 
of different cadres of health workers met the country’s 
19  Author interview with Miatta Zenabu Gbanya, Liberia Ministry of Health, 
December 12, 2018.
needs) productive and motivated health workforce; a 
re-engineered health infrastructure; and an epidemic 
preparedness, surveillance, and response system. The six 
other investment areas were: management capacity for 
medical supplies and diagnostics; enhancement of quality 
service delivery systems; comprehensive information, 
research, and communication management; sustainable 
community engagement; leadership and governance 
capacity; and efficient health financing systems.
In March 2015, the health ministry held a technical 
retreat to review and refine the critical investment areas 
in the plan. In April 2015, a national stakeholder meeting 
reached consensus on the investment plan. The health 
ministry, president, and the president’s cabinet then 
endorsed the “Investment Plan for Building a Resilient 
Health System, Liberia: 2015 to 2021” (Liberia Ministry 
of Health, 2015).
The ministry and its development partners carried 
out an analysis and estimated that the plan would cost 
a total of $1.7 billion. The investment plan included 
the estimated funding available for each priority in 
the investment plan, breaking down those estimates 
by donor. The plan estimated that only $558.6 million 
was available from existing donor commitments, and 
predicted a funding gap of $735 million.
For monitoring and evaluation, the plan included 32 
core indicators tracking components of health system 
surveillance, human resources, the health information 
system, the supply chain, and service delivery. The 
indicators were mostly derived from those already 
included in the 2011-2021 national health policy (Liberia 
Ministry of Health, 2015).
Soon after the plan was finalized, new developments 
reiterated the urgency of strengthening the health system. 
While the initial outbreak had been contained by May 2015, 
there was a flareup of six new cases in June and July of that 
year, two of which were fatal. The cause was not clear, but the 
health system responded quickly and effectively, containing 
the outbreak with no infections among healthcare workers 
(World Health Organization, 2015). Liberia was better 
prepared than at the start of the crisis, but the new outbreak 
reminded ministry staff that a threat could come at any time.
Creating a New Community Health 
Worker Cadre
One of the main pillars of the investment plan was 
strengthening the health workforce. Within that area, the 
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community health volunteer program was a top priority, 
and the health ministry began to transform the program’s 
structure and capabilities. 
Frontline community health volunteers were 
important because they could connect people in 
remote areas with the health system, direct them to 
health facilities for treatment, share health information 
with people, and detect evidence of potential disease 
outbreaks or public health problems at the early stages. 
But in Liberia, those volunteers worked within various 
donor-funded programs that had different goals and 
were not aligned with a standard national policy or 
training curriculum. Health ministry officials wanted to 
create a new cadre of health workers with a common set 
of skills, working to advance national health policy goals. 
This cadre would work in underserved areas, serving the 
29 percent of Liberians who lived at least five kilometers 
from a health facility (Boima, 2017).
The very notion of volunteerism was in itself 
problematic given the importance of connecting people 
around the country to the health system. “When you 
have people working voluntarily, the issue of quality 
becomes a problem, the issue of accountability becomes 
a problem,” said Derry S. Duokie, the assistant director 
of the community health services division at the health 
ministry. “Those who were volunteering were not paid, 
so we couldn’t hold them accountable for reporting of 
activities.”20
In August 2015, the ministry partnered with Last 
Mile Health, an NGO that brought health services to 
rural Liberians, to run a pilot community health worker 
program with systematic supervision, supply chains, 
and compensation for workers. The pilot utilized an 
integrated community case management strategy to 
extend the reach of public health services by providing 
treatment of malaria, pneumonia, and diarrhea to 
populations with limited access to health facilities, and 
especially to children under five. The WHO and UNICEF 
had endorsed the strategy in 2012 (World Health 
Organization, 2016).
Last Mile Health ran the pilot in two counties, 
including Rivercess County, the poorest in the country. 
Implementation occurred in phases for programmatic 
reasons, allowing the NGO to evaluate its effects in a 
“control” group – the three health districts where the 
20  Author interview with Derry S. Duokie, Liberia Ministry of Health, December 
12, 2018.
program was not initially implemented, where the existing 
community health volunteers continued to work – versus 
the remaining three districts, which benefited from the 
intervention. The pilot showed a significant improvement 
in health indicators in the intervention areas, including 
the proportion of children receiving care and treatment 
rates for fever, diarrhea, and acute respiratory infections 
(White, et al., 2018). In July 2016, encouraged by those 
results, the health ministry began implementing this 
incentivized community health worker model around the 
country in areas at least five kilometers from the nearest 
health facility.
Health officials went to local communities to tell 
them about the program, officially named the National 
Community Health Assistant Program. “We told them 
this is our vision,” Duokie said. “To recruit people beyond 
the five kilometer radius of a health facility to help provide 
a package of essential life-saving primary health care 
services and epidemic surveillance within communities 
and to households on an equitable basis, at the doorstep, 
especially to kids under five years old and pregnant 
women and women of childbearing age.” Local leaders, 
such as heads of citizen groups, districts, chiefdoms, 
and clans, along with other community members, then 
chose the community members who became community 
health assistants.21
The assistants “are people within the communities 
that the community looks up to, and they become the 
voice for the ministry to use as a conduit in passing our 
information to them,” Kateh said.22 Becoming a community 
health assistant did not require any specialized education 
beyond basic literacy and arithmetic skills.
The next step was training. The ministry trained small 
groups of master trainers, who were health professionals 
such as clinicians, nurses, and physician assistants, then 
sent them out to train community health assistants. The 
first training module focused on registration, mapping 
the community, and getting to know the local population. 
The community health assistants completed a mapping 
exercise after the first training module, then returned for 
a second module, which included areas such as family 
planning, health promotion messages, and surveillance 
and reporting of key diseases. Two other modules 
addressed child health and special services. They learned 
21  Author interview with Derry S. Duokie, Liberia Ministry of Health, December 
12, 2018.
22  Author interview with Francis Kateh, Liberia Ministry of Health, December 12, 
2018.
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how to detect signs of diarrhea, pneumonia, malaria, 
polio, and other diseases that could indicate a community 
health problem. They also were trained in administering 
some medications for uncomplicated malaria, diarrhea, 
and pneumonia for children under five. “Whenever they 
suspect any case [of a priority disease], they report it to 
the health facilities, the health facilities report it to the 
district surveillance officer, and the district surveillance 
officer follows up and does an investigation,” Duokie 
said.23
The ministry enlisted community health service staff, 
mostly nurses or physician’s assistants working within 
the public sector health system as community services 
supervisors, to oversee the community health assistants. 
Under the old volunteer system, there was no defined 
supervision. In the community health assistant program, 
each supervisor oversaw ten community health assistants 
and was obligated to check with each assistant twice 
every month. These supervisors also had their normal 
community health administration responsibilities to 
attend to, however, which included accounting, program 
management, and trips to the capital. That limited the 
time available to work with the community health 
assistants. For this reason, administrative capacity was 
an area of weaknesses.24
Each community health assistant received $70 each 
month. This amount was not paid by the government, 
but by the NGO partnering with the county health team 
in that specific area. The mode of payment varied based 
on the region. When possible, volunteers were paid using 
mobile money services. In areas without access to mobile 
money or banking services, they were paid in cash.25
The stated goals of the program were to provide 
quality health services, generate increased demand for 
routine health services, overcome challenges associated 
with accessing care, develop community engagement, 
and improve governance and accountability. The 
ministry decided to refer to the new community health 
worker cadre as community health assistants instead of 
community health workers to make a distinction between 
these workers and the civil servants working in the public 
health system. “The cabinet was very strategic about that,” 
23  Author interview with Francis Kateh, Liberia Ministry of Health, December 12, 
2018.
24  Author interview with Derry S. Duokie, Liberia Ministry of Health, December 
12, 2018.
25  Author interview with Derry S. Duokie, Liberia Ministry of Health, December 
12, 2018.
Dahn said. The ministry intended that the term assistant 
would help manage expectations about the frontline 
health personnel’s pay and benefits.26
To implement the program, the ministry led a 
coalition of organizations including the International 
Rescue Committee, Last Mile Health, Partners in 
Health, Plan International, CHAI, and funding partners 
including USAID, UNICEF, the Global Financing Facility, 
the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
and philanthropists. (Jallah, Kateh, & Panjabi, 2018) The 
ministry used a steering committee and technical working 
group to coordinate the planning, implementation, and 
evaluation of the project.27
Building Up the Health Workforce
There were other measures to strengthen the Liberian 
health workforce under the 2015 investment plan. These 
included an emergency hiring and management plan 
to place more of the contractors in the government 
health system on the government payroll, making them 
civil servants. The percentage of health workers on the 
national budget payroll increased from 58 percent in 
2015 to 68 percent in 2016, accounting for 7,214 out 
of 10,672 workers employed in public sector health 
facilities (Kesselly, et al., 2018). In September 2018, the 
health ministry announced that 2,000 additional health 
workers would be added to the payroll and that nurses 
and doctors would receive a pay raise (Foyofayiah, 2018) .
At the same time, the ministry tried to remove 
workers from the payroll who were not at their assigned 
places of work and had no written evidence of leave or 
excuse from work. In April 2018, after the Internal Audit 
Agency identified more than 2,400 health workers on 
the government payroll whom county health authorities 
could not account for, the ministry crosschecked and 
verified that 750 staff could not be located or linked to 
a particular place of assignment. The finding was made 
under the administration of President Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf, and the names were deleted under her successor, 
President George Weah, who took office in 2018 (Sieh, 
2018). 
The plan also included measures to improve the 
education of health workers, especially the most-needed 
26  Author Interview with Bernice Dahn, A. M. Dogliotti College of Medicine, 
December 11, 2018.
27  Author email exchange with Derry S. Duokie, Liberia Ministry of Health, April 
4, 2019.
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categories, through the Health Workforce Program. 
“There were virtually no specialized physicians in the 
country and a lot of people had to go to Ghana” for 
treatment, said Moses Massaquoi, country director of 
the Clinton Health Access Initiative in Liberia.28 This 
was due to a loss of Liberian doctors to opportunities 
abroad and poor medical training in the country. Medical 
education had suffered from a lack of faculty and access 
to training, with many students taking more than eight 
years to complete a five-year program and half of enrolled 
students choosing to withdraw from medical school 
rather than finish their education. To address this, the 
World Bank and the United States government funded 
academic partnerships to strengthen the Liberian College 
of Physicians and Surgeons, an institution established 
in 2012 to oversee postgraduate medical education and 
medical accreditation. Through these partnerships, 
three US hospitals deployed visiting faculty to teach 
at Liberia’s only medical school in 2017 and 2018. This 
allowed around 30 specialists in the highest priority 
areas - pediatrics, internal medicine, general surgery, 
and OB/GYN - to graduate. In 2018, the medical school 
added three additional faculties for family medicine, 
ophthalmology, and psychiatry (A.M. Dogliotti College 
of Medicine).
The health ministry also constructed additional 
housing units for health workers in rural areas, an effort 
to counter the poor housing conditions that contributed 
to health worker dissatisfaction. In October 2015, the 
health ministry and the National Housing Authority 
introduced a program to help 100 health workers in eight 
counties buy their own homes through a housing subsidy 
(FrontPageAfrica, 2015).
Strengthening Emergency 
Preparedness and Response
Another of the three priority areas under the 
health investment plan was strengthening epidemic 
preparedness, surveillance, and response. This included 
the expansion of the established surveillance and early 
warning and response system to ensure it was able to 
detect and respond to future health threats.
One problem standing in the way of building a resilient 
health system was Liberia’s poor disease surveillance 
28  Author interview with Moses Massaquoi, Clinton Health Access Initiative, 
December 6, 2018.
and response system, which had failed to detect and 
adequately respond to the Ebola epidemic. When Ebola 
arrived in early 2014, there had only been a small unit 
working on disease surveillance in the health ministry. 
“When there was an outbreak in a county, people left 
from the ministry [in Monrovia] and went to the county 
to help the county health team address that,” Dahn said. 
“The system could not address the scale of Ebola that we 
had.”29
At the time that the investment plan was being 
developed, health ministry staff had been discussing 
the possibility of developing a public health institute in 
Liberia. “The idea was around, but Ebola pushed it faster 
than we would have done it as a country,” said Tolbert 
Nyenswah, who had led the Incident Management System 
during the Ebola response.30 A public health institute 
would be responsible for emergency health preparedness 
and response, health research, and environmental and 
health safety, and would include a reference laboratory 
to prevent, detect, and respond to public health threats. 
At the time of the investment plan there was only a 
small unit in the health ministry with an emergency 
response role. The WHO had developed a proposal for 
a Liberian national public health institute, which led to 
the investment plan’s endorsement of an autonomous 
institution that would be called the National Public 
Health Institute of Liberia.
In 2015, Nyenswah and colleagues went on study 
tours supported by the WHO and the United States 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to learn 
from public health institutes in other countries. They 
visited a mix of higher- and lower-income countries, 
including Thailand, South Africa, Nigeria, and the 
United States. A major lesson learned from those study 
trips was the for need for trained field epidemiologists 
and disease intelligence officers who were trained to 
investigate potential outbreaks. Another takeaway was 
the importance of good laboratory facilities capable of 
testing samples and identifying infectious diseases. The 
Liberian team also learned about the importance of 
monitoring environmental health, foodborne diseases, 
waterborne diseases, and other public health hazards.31
29  Author Interview with Bernice Dahn, A. M. Dogliotti College of Medicine, 
December 11, 2018.
30  Author interview with Tolbert Nyenswah, National Public Health Institute of 
Liberia, December 13, 2018.
31  Author interview with Tolbert Nyenswah, National Public Health Institute of 
Liberia, December 13, 2018.
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After the study tours, Nyenswah and his colleagues 
held stakeholder meetings with public health leaders and 
health experts in Liberia. These stakeholders included 
representatives of the World Health Organization’s 
Liberia country office and its Geneva headquarters, the 
US National Institutes of Health, the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, the Liberian Medical 
and Dental Council, and the health committees in the 
Liberian parliament. Nyenswah and his team shared the 
results of the study tours and discussed the public health 
institute with stakeholders to build broad support. The 
discussions with stakeholders also helped frame the four 
critical areas in which the institute would work: disease 
surveillance and epidemic preparedness and response, a 
reference laboratory, environmental and public health, 
and biomedical research. In February and March 2016, 
Nyenswah and his colleagues released operational and 
strategic plans for creating the public health institute. 
They also gathered a team of lawyers to develop a legal 
framework for the institute.32
There were some questions that Nyenswah had to 
answer to ensure that legislators, health ministry officials, 
and other government leaders would back the plan. “There 
were two big contentious issues,” Nyenswah said. “Why 
are you creating another institution parallel to the ministry 
of health? That was a big one.” The other question involved 
how the new institute would affect existing institutions 
that would be transferred from the health ministry to the 
public health institute. This included an existing research 
institution, the emergency operations centers around the 
country, and three divisions of the health ministry’s bureau 
of preventive services: the national reference laboratory, the 
division of disease prevention and control, and the division 
of environmental and occupational health. Working within 
each of these institutions were civil servants who would be 
concerned about their roles and job security under a new 
public health institute.33
Legislators asked about these issues and Nyenswah 
wanted to eliminate the possibility that political 
resistance within the legislature slowed down or stopped 
the creation of the public health institute. To ensure that 
the law creating the National Public Health Institute of 
Liberia went through the legislature easily, Nyenswah 
sought high-level support. “We made a presentation to 
32  Author interview with Tolbert Nyenswah, National Public Health Institute of 
Liberia, December 13, 2018.
33  Author interview with Tolbert Nyenswah, National Public Health Institute of 
Liberia, December 13, 2018.
the cabinet because we wanted this to be a presidential 
bill,” he said, referring to legislation that was introduced 
by the president’s office, rather than an individual 
legislator.34
Nyenswah and his team argued that it was important 
to move these offices out of the ministry because an 
autonomous agency with those functions would provide 
rapid, flexible, and efficient decision making to support 
the goal of protecting the country against future public 
health crises. (International Association of National 
Public Health Institutes, 2017) “The minister of health 
and myself went to the cabinet twice and presented the 
concept, the operational plan, and strategic plan for 
establishing the institute,” Nyenswah said. “The cabinet 
endorsed it and the president submitted the bill to the 
legislature.” The bill, which established the institute as 
an autonomous government agency accountable to the 
minister of health, passed into law in December 2016 and 
was signed by the president the next month. In February 
2017, the president appointed the National Public Health 
Institute of Liberia’s executive team, with Nyenswah in 
the top position, along with a board of directors.35
A key question was how to staff the new institute. 
Nyenswah recruited people who had worked in the 
Incident Management System, which coordinated the 
national emergency response to the Ebola outbreak 
and which he had led during the crisis. After the crisis, 
this organization was absorbed into the new public 
health institute. “Most of the people who worked in the 
incident management team, who were pillar leads, came 
together to establish [the public health institute], so we 
had this institutional memory already on how things 
should run,” Nyenswah said. To make the transition to a 
new institution more appealing for staff from the health 
ministry, he arranged for better compensation. “We 
didn’t make them civil servants,” he said. “We said you 
would be corporate employees. There will be a salary 
difference. Your benefits now will be more than what you 
had as civil servants.”36
But he also let go some employees whose skills were 
not a good fit. To do this in a transparent way, the public 
health institute hired an independent human resources 
34  Author interview with Tolbert Nyenswah, National Public Health Institute of 
Liberia, December 13, 2018.
35  Author interview with Tolbert Nyenswah, National Public Health Institute of 
Liberia, December 13, 2018.
36  Author interview with Tolbert Nyenswah, National Public Health Institute of 
Liberia, December 13, 2018.
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firm to vet all employees and create employee files and 
personal histories. “Now we’ve submitted to the board 
to retrench about 60 plus redundant persons who we 
don’t need,” Nyenswah said in December 2018. These 
employees would receive severance packages or be 
entitled to benefits from the civil service agency.37
The institute also created a new field epidemiology 
program. “They are the foot soldiers in the field,” he 
said. “We call them the shoe leather epidemiologists.” 
Nyenswah’s team recruited district and county surveillance 
officers from people working in the emergency operations 
centers in each of the counties. These people were already 
on the ministry of health payroll, and were skilled health 
workers: physicians, physician’s assistants, nurses, and 
environmental health technicians. The public health 
institute teamed with Emory University and the US 
Centers for Disease Control to offer a three-month basic 
training program and nine-month intermediate training, 
where people learned the fundamentals of disease 
detection, surveillance, and response. “This capacity is 
[now] over all 93 districts across the country,” Nyenswah 
said. “They track diseases, pick up specimens, and have 
a sample transfer program.” The field epidemiologists 
submitted reports electronically, with data from across the 
country presented at a weekly meeting in the public health 
institute that brought together public health institute staff, 
health ministry staff, and donors and implementing NGO 
partners. “You will know how many measles cases there 
are in Liberia, whether there are any road traffic injuries, 
whether Ebola surfaced anywhere in the country, how 
many samples were taken to the lab and tested, and the 
negative or positive results of those samples,” he said. 
“That’s the work we do here on a daily basis.”38
Re-Engineering Health Infrastructure
The health investment plan included measures to 
improve many aspects of Liberia’s health infrastructure. 
This resulted in various projects financed with donor 
support. 
Permanent triage facilities were a great need for 
the health system. After assessing 45 health facilities 
across the country, UNOPS built triages at 24 of them 
and delivered major hospital renovations at two sites, 
37  Author interview with Tolbert Nyenswah, National Public Health Institute of 
Liberia, December 13, 2018.
38  Author interview with Tolbert Nyenswah, National Public Health Institute of 
Liberia, December 13, 2018.
along with three new isolation units, power, lighting, 
medical and laboratory equipment, and other assets. 
By August 2016, the majority of these projects were 
completed (United Nations in Liberia, n.d.). A USAID-
funded project targeted infrastructure improvements 
at 48 health care facilities in three counties, including 
triage, incinerators, wells, and latrines (John Snow, Inc., 
2018). WHO and UNOPS supplied over 520 pieces of 
equipment, including x-ray units, infant incubators, and 
vaccine refrigerators, to health facilities with support 
from the World Bank (World Bank, 2017). USAID 
funded the creation of a modern infectious disease 
outpatient clinic at JFK Medical Center, Liberia’s largest 
referral hospital. (Kwanue, 2018) The investment plan 
also called for the Redemption Hospital in Monrovia 
(which was in a building not originally intended to be a 
hospital, but rather a market hall) to be replaced by a new 
facility. The World Bank funded the first phase of that 
project, contributing $14 million out of a total project 
cost of around $30 million (Ministry of Health - Liberia, 
2016). USAID and CDC supported the construction 
of new laboratories that allowed for testing of more 
infectious diseases, so that Liberia would not have to 
outsource that testing to neighboring countries.
There were also projects that strengthened the 
medical supply chain. For example, USAID assisted 
the health ministry in financing a new 3,000 square 
meter warehouse to centralize storage of all health 
commodities, such as medicines and medical supplies, 
which could make the supply chain easier to manage. 
That building was dedicated in December 2017. USAID 
also partnered with the health ministry to launch a new 
electronic logistics management information system 
designed to allow the Liberian government and donors 
to check the stock of drugs and supplies at all levels of the 
supply chain (Management Sciences for Health, 2018).
Results
The investment plan provided a clear set of priorities 
for strengthening the Liberian health system. It allowed 
the Liberian health ministry to coordinate with donors 
and partners on agreed-upon priorities. But the health 
ministry’s 2016/17 to 2019/20 health sector resource 
mapping report, released in January of 2017, indicated 
that implementation was slow in some investment areas. 
The ministry found that many activities that had been 
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costed during the development of the investment plan had 
changed and responsible parties were not always aware 
of what had been included in their area of responsibility. 
There was also a lack of coordination between funding 
sources and health ministry stakeholders.
The ministry’s analysis in the 2017 resource mapping 
report projected funding gaps in the top two priority 
investment areas under the investment plan for the 
2016/17 to 2019/2020 fiscal years. For the health workforce 
investment area, the ministry projected a gap in funding 
of more than $101 million out of a cost of just under $297 
million. For the health infrastructure investment area, the 
ministry projected a gap of more than $164 million out 
of a cost of roughly $231 million. But in the third priority 
investment area, epidemic preparedness and response, 
the ministry projected a surplus of more than $30 million 
over a projected cost of just under $34 million (Liberian 
Ministry of Health, 2017).
While funding for the health system did not line up 
exactly with the priorities in the investment plan, there 
were notable achievements nonetheless. “Since we 
established the NPHIL, we have had some outbreaks, 
like meningitis and yellow fever,” Dahn said. “The 
interventions were swift. They [the outbreaks] did not 
become overwhelming.”39 In the 2018 calendar year, the 
public health institute detected and responded to 58 
outbreaks of infectious disease in 13 counties, including 
Lassa Fever, measles, meningococcal disease, pertussis, 
and monkeypox. The health system responded to these 
within 48 hours of notification. “With all that activity, 
service delivery was never interrupted,” Gbanya said. “To 
me, that’s a test of the system.” The laboratory diagnostic 
capacity was increased to testing for 11 diseases through 
three decentralized public health laboratories. Previously, 
Liberian laboratories could only test for three diseases, 
measles, malaria, and HIV.40
“We have built the public health workforce by training 
about 160 field epidemiologists at the central and county 
levels to conduct surveillance activities and respond to 
outbreaks,” Gbanya said. “We do still have a lot of work 
to do but we are not where we started in 2014 when the 
Ebola outbreak was declared.”41
39  Author Interview with Bernice Dahn, A. M. Dogliotti College of Medicine, 
December 11, 2018.
40  Author interview with Miatta Zenabu Gbanya, Liberia Ministry of Health, 
December 12, 2018.
41  Author interview with Miatta Zenabu Gbanya, Liberia Ministry of Health, 
December 12, 2018.
The investment plan contributed to infrastructure 
improvements in important areas of the health system. 
More health facilities were operational and the density 
of health facilities increased from 1.6 per 10,000 people 
in 2015 to 1.9 in 2016 (Wolmarans & Akwataghibe, 
2017). More facilities had isolation units and triages 
than was the case when Ebola first hit Liberia in 2014. 
New maternal waiting homes allowed women far from 
health facilities to arrive before their pregnancy due dates 
instead of travelling long distances over difficult terrain 
when birth was imminent. Laboratory facilities were 
greatly improved, which allowed the health system to test 
specimens for the presence of seven priority infectious 
diseases, and for those samples to be processed within 
24 hours. Previously, the system only tested for three 
infectious diseases, requiring that samples be sent to 
neighboring countries, where the turnaround time could 
be as much as one week. 
Despite these achievements, the health system was still 
in need of more investment. The number of trained health 
workers remained far below the needs of the country. As 
of 2016, there were 4,434 core health workers, equivalent 
to 11 per 10,000 people. The WHO recommended a 
minimum of 23 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 10,000 
people (Wolmarans & Akwataghibe, 2017).
Out of pocket expenditures remained high, evidence 
that the public sector health system, which was legally 
mandated to provide free care to citizens, was not 
achieving its objective of providing free health services 
and was not meeting the demands of the population for 
quality health services. “The out of pocket expenditure 
should be at most 10 percent to 15 percent,” Gbanya said. 
“But over the last 10 years, out of pocket expenditure 
has steadily increased from 35 percent to 46 percent, 
which signifies a lack of financial protection for the poor. 
Most of the out of pocket payments are incurred due to 
purchasing medicines from external sources as a result 
of stockout at public facilities.” There were discussions 
in government about instituting some fees for health 
services at public sector facilities, but officials saw the 
matter as politically difficult.42
The investment plan was intended in part to guide 
donor funds and interventions to the health ministry’s 
policy priorities, but some priorities remained 
underfunded. “The reality is not all donors subscribe to 
42  Author interview with Miatta Zenabu Gbanya, Liberia Ministry of Health, 
December 12, 2018.
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a common platform,” Flomo said. “Some partners only 
capitalize on a portion of what is in the investment plan.”43
Finding the money to invest in the health system 
became even more difficult as domestic revenues 
shortages increased. Liberia’s economy stumbled in the 
2018 fiscal year as the country struggled with the effects 
of the Ebola outbreak, a collapse of commodity prices, 
the withdrawal of a UN peacekeeping force, and the 
perception of risk associated with the transition to a new 
government in January 2018. The fiscal deficit widened 
to 5.2 percent of GDP and revenue shortfalls amounted 
to 20 percent of the national budget (World Bank, 2018). 
At the same time, donor support was decreasing. “The 
donor support is already going down, and not all the 
pledges were actually received,” Dahn said in December 
2018. It was unclear how the health financing situation 
would look over the long term.44
“You cannot do what it takes if you do not have the 
finances,” Kateh said. Liberia is one of the few countries 
almost meeting the African Union goal of spending 
15 percent of the budget on health services, “but the total 
country budget is about $500 million. So 15 percent of 
$500 million is less than $17 million. If we put this into the 
health system, it is not enough. More than 60 percent of 
that budget is salary payment. What actually goes toward 
operations, maintenance, and equipment is not much.”45
“We have not mobilized all the resources needed to 
implement” the Investment Plan for Building a Resilient 
Health System, Gbanya said. But “a lot of what we are 
implementing, in my view, is aligned with the plan. That’s 
a big plus.”46
Lessons Learned
Liberia’s experience developing a health system investment 
plan suggested potential lessons that could inform health 
leaders in other donor-dependent contexts. The country 
benefitted from keeping donors engaged in health policy 
after the Ebola outbreak subsided and investing in 
frontline health workers. Health ministry leaders believed 
43  Author interview with Matthew Flomo, Liberia Ministry of Health, December 
10, 2018.
44  Author Interview with Bernice Dahn, A. M. Dogliotti College of Medicine, 
December 11, 2018.
45  Author interview with Francis Kateh, Liberia Ministry of Health, December 12, 
2018.
46  Author interview with Miatta Zenabu Gbanya, Liberia Ministry of Health, 
December 12, 2018.
that more donor resources could have been channeled 
into permanent infrastructure instead of temporary 
infrastructure that was not useful after the crisis subsided.
Keep donors engaged after an 
emergency
Liberia’s investment plan kept donors committed to 
the building the country’s health system for longer than 
may have been the case without such a plan. Rather 
than accepting a short-term temporary rebuilding 
plan or pushing donors aside in the interest of national 
sovereignty, Liberia’s health ministry engaged external 
partners in the development of a longer-term plan 
that aligned with the country’s existing national health 
policies. This created an incentive for donors to stay 
engaged and to work on permanent infrastructure 
improvements, instead of withdrawing from the country 
once the health system had contained the immediate 
epidemic crisis. “Many times after emergencies, you see 
governments, once they take over, striving for national 
sovereignty, so they tend to drive away partners who 
could help them,” Dahn said. “We decided to keep the 
partners around to help us until we are strong enough.”47
The health ministry achieved this cooperation 
by developing a longer-term investment plan and 
incorporating external partners into the process of 
developing the investment plan through stakeholder 
meetings. Discussions with those partners ensured that 
everyone had the same goals in mind. Partners could look 
to the investment plan to align their contributions and 
activities with agreed-upon goals, reducing the problem 
of fragmented, uncoordinated health sector assistance.
Although Liberia did not receive enough money to 
implement everything in that plan, donors supported 
many priorities and helped strengthen the health 
system and make it more resilient to future threats. The 
participatory approach between the health ministry and 
external health actors, including donors and technical 
partners, has helped build capacity in the ministry and 
throughout the health system.
Invest in frontline health workers
Liberia’s health ministry prioritized the development of 
an effective cadre of frontline health workers, a relatively 
47  Author Interview with Bernice Dahn, A. M. Dogliotti College of Medicine, 
December 11, 2018.
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cost-effective way to increase epidemic preparedness, 
improve health outcomes and encourage usage of the 
public sector health system. These workers made their 
rounds in rural areas, looking for signs of disease outbreaks, 
bringing basic treatment and health information to 
families that would not otherwise engage with the health 
system, and encouraging those in need of care to access 
government health facilities. While these workers were not 
a replacement for skilled doctors and nurses, they could be 
quickly trained and dispatched into the field. Their pay was 
also lower than more skilled health professionals, helping 
to contain costs. Liberia’s investment in the Community 
Health Assistant program was an important part of 
building a more resilient health system.
Liberia’s experience suggests that frontline health 
workers may be more effective with systematic oversight 
and standardization of training and pay. The Community 
Health Assistant program was an effort to learn from the 
shortcomings of the previous volunteer-based model, 
which was fragmented and largely defined by the donor 
or implementing partner working with different groups 
of volunteers. Although these volunteers were helpful 
in the Ebola response, the health ministry struggled to 
track what was happening across the country, especially 
because the external partners overseeing the different 
groups of volunteers did not always work closely with 
the government’s county health teams. The Community 
Health Assistant program created a new cadre of health 
workers with clear supervision from country health 
teams, a unified training curriculum, and standardized 
wages. The health ministry could more clearly track 
and understand how these workers were contributing 
to national health policy goals, and the outcomes on the 
ground suggested that they were more effective that the 
fragmented volunteer model.
Flexibility and funding for the 
long-term
One problem in achieving long-term resiliency in the 
health system was donors’ investment in temporary 
infrastructure during the Ebola crisis, instead of building 
permanent infrastructure that would benefit Liberia after 
the epidemic subsided. Donor restrictions limited most 
NGOs to temporary infrastructure and other assistance 
that could be delivered quickly. Similarly, while health 
workers received training in infection prevention to 
help with immediate needs during the Ebola crisis, there 
was little investment in nursing and medical education 
to improve the health workforce over the long term 
(Ling, et al., 2017). This was frustrating for leaders in 
the health ministry. “A country that does not have good 
infrastructure, which led to some of the problems we 
had during Ebola, I think some of the investment would 
have been looking at permanent structures, instead 
of just temporary structures,” Kateh said. “There was 
so much money that went into temporary things that 
now we cannot use, and this funding is already gone.”48 
An alternative approach would have been for donors 
to include some more permanent infrastructure and 
health worker training support along with temporary 
assistance.
48  Author interview with Francis Kateh, Liberia Ministry of Health, December 12, 
2018.
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